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Case Notes
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-Practice and Procedure-Due Process
Clause Does Not Require Tenants of Federal Housing Administration
Financed Rental Project to be Given Trial Type Hearing on Proposed
Rent Increase. Langevin v. Chenango Court, Inc., 447 F.2d 296 (2d
Cir. 1971).
Plaintiffs are tenants in a housing project owned by defendant
Chenango Court, Inc., and constructed under a low and moderate in-
come housing program authorized by Section 221 (d) (3) of the National
Housing Act.' Pursuant to regulations promulgated under the Act,2 the
1. 12 U.S.C. § 1715 l(d)(3) (1970). Congressional recognition of low income
families' need for housing is enunciated in the Housing Act of 1949 which es-
tablished as the national housing policy "the realization as soon as feasible of the goal
of a decent home and suitable living environment for every American family. .. ."
Housing Act of 1949, § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970). The rental housing program
established by § 221(d) (3) is one of several stratagems created by Congress to
help achieve that goal. The statute itself indicates that the program "is designed
to assist private industry in providing housing for low and moderate income families
and displaced families." National Housing Act, § 221(a), 12 U.S.C. § 17151 (a)
(1970). In its report on the bill which established the § 221(d) (3) program, the
Senate Committee on Banking and Currency noted that: "[flor families with in-
comes that do not permit home ownership at current construction costs and at
market interest rates, but who have incomes too high for public low-rent housing,
this section of the bill would also establish a new program of FHA-insured, long-
term low-interest-rate mortgage loans for moderate rental housing," S. Rep. No.
281, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. at 3, 4 (1961). Included in this report was the con-
clusion reached by the Subcommittee on Housing: "Existing institutions avail-
able to help achieve the national housing policy . . . are inadequate. It is
evident that families of low and moderate income cannot be housed decently,
within the foreseeable future, unless new programs for this purpose are fostered
by the Federal Government, or by State and local governments, or by all levels
of government.' " Id. at 4. Under § 221 (d) (3), newly constructed or rehabilitated
housing can be sponsored by either nonprofit or limited distribution organizations,
long-term financing to cover the cost of production is provided by the federal
government at a below market interest rate of three percent. The mortgage securing
such financing is guaranteed by the Federal Housing Administration. The purpose
of the subsidized interest rate is to enable a sponsor to keep costs low enough to
offer housing at rents that low and moderate income families can afford. Nonprofit
organizations are not allowed to secure any return from the sponsorship of the
project, but limited distribution sponsors are allowed a return of six percent per
annum on the equity they invest in the project. See Brief for Appellee Smith at
2-7; Brief of the Nat'l Housing and Economic Dev. Law project as amicus curiae
at 6-9.
2. Chenango is regulated by the FHA under a regulatory agreement pursuant
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landlord Chenango Court, Inc. filed an application for a rent increase
with the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and the increase was
subsequently granted. Plaintiffs brought this action seeking, inter alia, an
injunction against the FHA approved increase and a declaration that the
approval of the rent increase violated the National Housing Act and the
due process clause of the fifth amendment. The United States District
Court for the Northern District of New York dismissed the complaint for
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.- The United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, proceeding to the merits, held that
neither the National Housing Act, nor the due process clause of the
fifth amendment required tenants to be given a trial type hearing before
the FHA with regard to proposed rent increases and that the decision of
the FHA was not subject to judicial review.4
Generally, the test for due process requirements depends upon the par-
ticular fact situation.
Whenever a governmental body acts so as to injure an individual, the
Constitution requires that the act be consonant with due process of law. The
minimum procedural requirements necessary to satisfy due process depend
upon the circumstances and the interests of the parties involved. 5
to 12 U.S.C. § 1715 /(d)(3) (1970) and 24 C.F.R. § 221.529 (1972). The
standard agreement provides with respect to rents: "No increase will be made...
unless such increase is approved by the Commissioner, who will at any time enter-
tain a written request for an increase properly supported by the substantiating
evidence and within a reasonable time shall: (1) Approve a rental schedule that is
necessary to compensate for any net increase, occurring since the last approved
rental schedule, in taxes (other than income taxes) and operating and maintenance
expenses over which owners have no effective control, or (2) Deny the increase
stating the reasons therefore." FHA Form No. 1730 (Oct. 1969). The facts con-
sidered by the FHA in processing a rent increase are: (1) whether the project is
properly maintained, (2) whether the landlord's application is complete, (3)
whether the operating expenses of the project justify increased rents, (4) whether
economies could be made in the operation of the project, and generally whether the
rents for the project are reasonable. FHA Insuring Manual § 64205.2.
3. Langevin v. Chenango Court, Inc., 447 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1971). The
complaint was dismissed by the district court because no tenant had a claim in excess
of $10,000, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970).
4. 447 F.2d 296, 300 (2d Cir. 1971). The Second Circuit held that the
plaintiff's claim was "an 'action in the nature of Mandamus to compel an officer
or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to
the plaintiff,' 28 U.S.C. § 1361, which has no requirement of jurisdictional
amount." Id.
5. Dixon v. Ala. Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 155 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 930 (1961). See Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 163
(1951).
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Due process requires a trial type hearing6 when the decision making
process requires factual findings based upon the particular status of an
individual, rather than an evaluation of factors not related to any specific
individual.7 In short, due process requires a trial type hearing when the
facts involved are adjudicative rather than legislative.8The foundation of the law concerning trial type hearings was laid in
two United States Supreme Court decisions in the early part of this
century. In the earlier case, Londoner v. Denver,9 the City Council of
Denver, sitting as a board of equalization, assessed plaintiffs' land for
the cost of paving a street, giving plaintiffs the opportunity to file written
objections, but not granting them a hearing. The Court held that due
process encompassed more than submission of written material:
[S]omething more.. . is required by due process of law.... [A] hearing in its
very essence demands that he who is entitled to it shall have the right to sup-
port his allegations by argument however brief, and, if need be, by proof, how-
ever informal. 10
Subsequently, in Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. Board of Equaliza-
tion," the United States Supreme Court held that such a hearing was
unnecessary. This case, which also involved the City of Denver, was a
6. There are two principal kinds of hearings-trials and arguments. The key
to a trial type hearing is the opportunity given to present evidence, to present
written or oral argument, and to cross-examine opposing witnesses. An argument
type hearing is the typical procedure before an appellate court, where issues of law,
rather than issues of fact, are in dispute. While holdings that due process requires
an opportunity to present oral argument are rare, holdings that due process re-
quires a trial type hearing are common. 1 K.C. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise
§ 7.01 (1958). See also Hecht v. Monaghan, 307 N.Y. 461, 121 N.E.2d 421
(1954).
7. Powelton Civic Home Owners Ass'n v. Dep't of Housing and Urban Dev,,
284 F. Supp. 809, 829 (E.D. Pa. 1968). For purposes of the need for a trial type
hearing, facts are of two kinds-adjudicative and legislative. Facts about the
parties and their activities, business, and properties-facts that go to a jury in a
jury case-are adjudicative. Legislative facts are general facts which do not usually
concern the immediate parties, but which assist a tribunal in deciding questions of
law and policy. Davis supra note 6, at § 7.02-03 (1958). See e.g., Goldsmith v.
United States Bd. of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117 (1926); Bragg v. Weaver, 251
U.S. 57 (1919).
8. Davis supra note 6, at § 7.04. See also Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land &
Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855).
9. 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
10. Id. at 386.
11. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
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suit to prevent state officials from raising the assessed valuation of all
taxable property in that city without giving the plaintiff, an owner of
real property, a hearing. Justice Holmes distinguished Londoner by
pointing out that in that case:
A relatively small number of persons was concerned, who were exceptionally
affected, in each case upon individual grounds, and it was held that they had
a right to a hearing. But that decision is far from reaching a general de-
termination dealing only with the principle upon which all the assessments in a
county had been laid. 12
Bi-Metallic was followed approximately thirty years later by Bowles v.
Willingham.'3 Bowles was an action by a Georgia landlord challenging
the constitutionality of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, spe-
cifically the section which gave the Administrator power to establish
maximum rents for any defense area housing accommodation.' 4 Mrs. Wil-
lingham claimed that the Act violated the fifth amendment because it
made no provision for a hearing before the rent fixing order became
effective. The Court quoted from Justice Holmes' opinion in the Bi-
Metallic case in deciding the issue:
Where a rule of conduct applies to more than a few people it is impracticable
that everyone should have a direct voice in its adoption. The Constitution
does not require all public acts to be done in town meeting or an assembly of
the whole. General statutes within the state power are passed that affect the
person or property of the individuals, sometimes to the point of ruin, without
giving them a chance to be heard. 1
In addition to following the Bi-Metallic doctrine, Bowles is significant
for Justice Douglas' explanation of cases where due process requires a
hearing before an administrative order becomes effective:
[Clongress was dealing here [in Bowles] with the exigencies of wartime condi-
tions and the insistent demands of inflation control .... [T]he procedure which
Congress adopted was selected with the view of eliminating the necessity for
12. Id. at 446..
13. 321 U.S. 503 (1944).
14. 56 Stat. 23 (1942). Section 2(b) of the Act provides in part that "[w]hen-
ever in the judgment of the Administrator such action is necessary or proper in
order to effectuate the purposes of this Act, he shall issue a declaration setting
forth the necessity for, and recommendations with reference to, the stabilization
or reduction of rents for any defense-area housing accommodations within a par-
ticular defense-rental area."
15. 321 U.S. at 519, quoting Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. Bd. of Equalization, 239
U.S. at 445.
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"lengthy and costly trials with concomitant dissipation of the time and energies
of all concerned in litigation rather than in the common war effort." . . . To
require hearings for thousands of landlords before any rent control order
could be made effective might have defeated the program of price control.' 6
When the private interest infringed is considered to be of less importance
than the threatened public harm, "an official body can take summary
action pending a later hearing.' 17
In Gart v. Cole,18 tenants and landowners sought a hearing on the ex-
ecution of a slum redevelopment project. Under section 5 of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, then in effect, a trial type hearing would be
mandatory only in a "case of adjudication required by statute... ." Here
there was no "express requirement of an open adjudicative hearing . . .
in the Housing Act.120 The plaintiffs, however, sought to rely "upon the
implication of such a requirement from the nature and effect of the
determination to be made. ' 2 1 The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, however, ruled that since the purpose of the proceeding was to
comply with "a general plan for the relocation not of individuals, but of
a group within a geographically defined area," this was not a case of
adjudication .22
The impact of the determination is upon the group, not upon individuals, and,
... the number of residents affected by the relocation proposals and therefore
within the group is quite large.23
Recently, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Escalara v.
16. 321 U.S. at 520-21.
17. R.A. Holman & Co. v. SEC, 299 F.2d 127, 131 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
370 U.S. 911 (1962) (suspension of exemption from stock registration require-
ment). Compare Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950)
(seizure of mislabeled vitamin product), with Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970) (termination of welfare benefits).
18. 263 F.2d 244 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 978 (1959).
19. 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1970), formerly Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324, § 5, 60
Stat. 239.
20. 263F.2dat251.
21. Id. One contention that plaintiffs in Langevin did not particularly empha-
size was their alleged statutory right to a trial type hearing. This contention was
dismissed by the court of appeals which pointed to the language of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act with respect to such a hearing, and noted that § 221(d) (3)
of the National Housing Act "contains no such requirement.. 447 F.2d at 300.
22. 263 F.2d at 251.
23. Id. In such cases the determination is not such an adjudication of individual
interests as may justify the implied application of section 5 of the Administrative
Procedure Act.
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New York City Housing Authority,24 held that tenants in public housing
projects could not be constitutionally evicted without being afforded
adequate procedural safeguards. The tenants had initiated the action
challenging the constitutionality of the procedure used by the Housing
Authority in terminating tenancies and assessing additional rent
charges.25 In prescribing the minimum procedural safeguards necessitated
by due process the court held that it was a deprivation of due process to
deny tenants access to material in their folder and that it was improper to
deny the tenants an opportunity to confront and cross-examine persons
who supplied that information when the Housing Authority's action was
based on it.26
Certain aspects of the ... HA [Housing Authority] procedures cannot stand
without a convincing showing at trial that the HA has a compelling need for
procedural expedition.27
In a recent case28 involving a project similar to the one in Langevin,
the due process clause was held applicable to a private landlord in a
section 221 (d) (3) project. The tenants challenged the landlord's threat-
ened use of state eviction proceedings as a violation of due process inas-
much as the landlord failed to give them proper notice of good cause for
evicting them and had not afforded them a hearing. The court held that
the tenants were entitled to receive a notice alleging good cause, and to
have a hearing in the state courts to determine whether or not such good
cause has been alleged and proven.29 With respect to the project in ques-
tion:
[T]he federal and state governments have elected to place their power, property,
and privilege behind the landlords' authority over the tenants, and have in-
sinuated themselves into a position of interdependence with the landlords
[i.e. FHA insured mortgage, low interest rates, supervision by FHA]. What-
ever may be the situation of the landlords ... with respect to their labor re-
lations or to any immunity from intergovernmental taxation, their actions in
24. 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 853 (1970).
25. Id. at 856-57.
26. Id. at 862.
27. Id. at 861. "Upon trial, the HA may be able to show great need for ex-
pedited procedures, or the plaintiffs may fail to substantiate all of their allegations.
Therefore the fashioning of a remedy or a declaratory judgment must await the full
trial of these actions." Id. at 867.
28. McQueen v. Drucker, 317 F. Supp. 1122 (D. Mass. 1970), aff'd, 438 F.2d
781 (lst Cir. 1971).
29. 317 F. Supp. at 1132.
[Vol. I
CASE NOTES
relation to their tenants cannot be considered to be so private as to fall without
the scope of the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 0
In Hahn v. Gottlieb,31 the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit was
faced with an identical set of facts as existed in Langevin.32 The dis-
tinction between legislative and adjudicative facts was "particularly apt"
in that the tenants, rather than the landlord, sought the hearing, and in
this case "the project in question contains some 500 tenants, each of whom
has the same interest in low rent housing."33 After having determined
that the proceeding in which the tenants sought the right to be heard was
"basically an informal rate-making process,"3 4 the Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit held that the procedural safeguards of the due process
clause of the fifth amendment:
[A]re characteristic of adjudicatory proceedings, where the outcome turns on
accurate resolution of specific factual disputes. [citations omitted]. Such safe-
guards are not, however, essential in "legislative" proceedings, such as rate
making, where decision depends on broad familiarity with economic con-
ditions. [citations omitted].3 5
Equally important in the court's reasoning, denying tenants in a section
221 (d) (3) housing project the right to a hearing prior to their landlord's
proposed rent increase, is the possibility that, burdened with such
hearings, private investors might be discouraged from initiating section
221 (d) (3) projects."'
30. Id. at 1128. See Colon v. Tompkins Square Neighbors Inc., 294 F. Supp.
134 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (due process clause held applicable to a 221(d) (3) project
admission practice).
31. 430 F.2d 1243 (lst Cir. 1970).
32. Plaintiff tenants in the same § 221 (d) (3) project involved in McQueen v.
Drucker, supra note 28, sought an opportunity to be heard on a proposed rent
increase of $28 per apartment.
33. 430 F.2d at 1248. The court cited Justice Holmes' opinion in Bi-Metallic
Inv. Co. v. Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
34. Id.
35. Id. See also Davis, supra note 6, at § 7.02.
36. 430 F.2d at 1248. In McKinney v. Washington, 442 F.2d 726 (D.C. Cir.
1970) a case decided after Hahn, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
was faced with a similar claim by tenants of a National Capital Housing Authority
project. Id. at 726. The District of Columbia Circuit followed the reasoning of Hahn
and denied the tenants' request for a hearing on proposed rent increases saying:
"'[T]he governmental interest in a summary procedure for approving rent increases
outweighs the tenants' interest in procedural safeguards.'" 442 F.2d at 728, quoting
Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d at 1249. A related claim of tenants in both Hahn and
Langevin was that the FHA's action should be subject to judicial review. In holding
1972]
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By following the reasoning in Londoner and Escalara, the second
circuit in Langevin, in contrast to the court in Hahn, found it impossible
to deny that the facts involved in the tenants' case were adjudicative,
rather than legislative." The majority decision by Chief Judge Friendly
based its denial of a constitutional right to a hearing on the grounds that:
[H]ere the Government did not itself increase the rents but simply allowed the
landlord to institute an increase upon the termination of existing tenancies, as
the landlord would have been legally free to do but for its regulatory agreement
with the FHA.88
The court noted that in light of the congressional objective, of pro-
moting "the construction of housing by private enterprise," 9 the leaving
of rent control in section 221 (d) (3) projects to a regulatory agreement
between the Secretary and the mortgagor4 0 manifests congressional belief
that a requirement for a full-fledged public utility type hearing on all
proposed rent increases, "with the expense and delay necessarily incident
thereto, might well kill the goose in 'solicitude for the eggs.' "41 If rent
increases can be held up for months, pending the outcome of a trial-type
hearing, with all the concomitant discovery of records, taking of testi-
mony, and written findings by an examiner, construction on the basis of
distributions limited to six percent of equity investment42 might be
"decidedly unattractive" in an inflationary era.43 In the absence of a
governmental scheme of rent control, the due process clause does not
the FHA's decision to allow the rental increase unreviewable, the court in Hahn
reasoned that courts are "ill-equipped to superintend economic and managerial
decisions of the kind involved here." 430 F.2d at 1249. In Langevin, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit came to the same conclusion, but for different
reasons: "[I]t would be most unusual for Congress to subject to judicial review
discretionary action by an agency in administering a contract which Congress
authorized it to make. Other factors tending in the direction of nonreviewability
are the managerial nature of the responsibilities confided to the FHA, [citations
omitted], the need for expedition to achieve the Congressional objective . . . and
the quantity of appeals that would result if FHA authorizations to increase rents
were held reviewable. . . ." 447 F.2d at 303. For a discussion of the question of
reviewability of agency action, cited in both opinions, see Saferstein, Nonreview-
ability: A Functional Analysis of "Committed to Agency Discretion," 82 Harv. L.
Rev. 367 (1968).
37. 447 F.2d at 300.
38. Id. at 301.
39. See supra note 1.
40. See supra note 2.
41. 447 F.2d at 301, quoting Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d at 1246.
42. See supra note 1.
43. 447 F.2d at 301. See Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion in Bowles v. Willingham,
321 U.S. at 520-21.
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prohibit Congress from determining that federal assistance to private
industry to promote the construction of low and moderate income housing
is best accomplished by leaving the determination of rent increase ap-
plications to the "experienced staff at the FHA."
'44
The complementary objectives of Congress, admittedly constitutional and
laudable, were to encourage private enterprise to undertake the construction
of housing for low and moderate income and displaced families, thereby dis-
pensing with the use of governmental funds for equity investment, and to see
that an appropriate share of -the benefits of the federal assistance went to the
tenants. Within this framework Congress has the power to decide-or to
authorize the FHA to decide-what procedural mix will best accomplish its
aims .45
Judge Oakes, who wrote the dissenting opinion in Langevin, was not
persuaded by the majority's argument that the government did not itself
increase the rents, but allowed the landlord to implement the increase:
To my mind, a tenant in a project financed with the use of public funds at sub-
sidized interest rates should stand in no worse shoes than the tenants in, say, city
housing authority projects. [citations omitted]. The distinction advanced by
the majority, that here the Government did not itself increase the rents but
simply allowed the landlord to institute an increase, is to me a distinction with-
out a difference. [citations omitted]. 46
Judge Oakes further contended that this should not be different from a
case where a private park, with a municipal purpose, was held subject
to the equal protection clause.47 Likewise, the dissent continued, if a
tenant is forced to move from Chenango because of his inability to pay
the higher rent, what would make his eviction different from a tenant in
Escalara, who is evicted for violating the project rules? 48 To the extent
that due process is required, decent housing is "just as basic and integral
a part of life and liberties as opportunities for employment . . . for edu-
cation . . . or for welfare benefits. . . ."I' Judge Oakes concluded that
the tenants at Chenango should at least be afforded a proper notice of
44. 447 F.2d at 301.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 304.
47. Id. See also Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Pub. Util. Comm'n
v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952) (Congressional agency regulation of District of
Columbia bus company subjects company's radio broadcasting service to fifth
amendment).
48. 447 F.2d 305.
49. Id. at 306. [citations omitted] See also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970) (welfare); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959) (employment);
Slochower v. Bd. of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956) (education).
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the proposed rent increase with an opportunity to confront and cross-
examine persons substantiating the landlord's application." What is the
difference to the tenants whether the government itself increases the rents,
or simply permits the landlord to increase them?
Arguments as to landlord financial problems and agency administrative in-
convenience seem to me beside the point. "There can be no compromise on
the footing of convenience or expediency, or because of a natural desire to be
rid of harassing delay, when the minimal requirement [of the right to a hearing
as a rudiment of 'fair play'] has been neglected or ignored." 5'
The Second Circuit's holding in Langevin that the essence of the plain-
tiffs' dispute was of an adjudicative nature52 and the court's subsequent
denial of the right to a hearing based upon the distinction that the gov-
ernment did not itself increase the rents but merely allowed the landlord
to do the same,53 represents a departure from the use of the adjudicative-
legislative test as a factor in determining whether there is a constitutional
right to a trial type hearing.54 Although the court's reasoning does appear
to involve " a distinction without a difference," 5 the Second Circuit's
opinion should be viewed in light of the stated objectives of the section
221 (d) (3) housing program "to assist private industry in providing
housing for low and moderate income families and displaced families."56
The significance of Langevin rests in the answer to the question of
whether "a mandatory provision for subjecting all rent increases in such
projects to what would amount to a full-fledged public utility rate pro-
ceeding," would actually "kill the goose in 'solicitude for the eggs.' ,,5r
50. 447 F.2d at 306. See similar requirements of due process in Escalara v.
New York City Housing Authority, 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1970).
51. 447 F.2d at 306, quoting Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 301
U.S. 292, 305 (1937).
52. 447 F.2d at 300; contra, Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d at 1248.
53. 447 F.2d at 301.
54. While the adjudicative-legislative test can be seen as representative of the
tendency of American courts to proceed in the same way in same or similar cases,
Langevin can be seen as representing the doctrine that "general rules are only
generally controlling .... [t]hey become qualified as experience shows the need for
modification and exception." W. Gellhorn & C. Byse, Administrative Law 715
(4th ed. 1960).
55. 447 F.2d at 304. The only case cited in support of the majority's distinction
that the government did not itself increase the rents but merely allowed the landlord
to do the same, Hahn v. Gottlieb, also based its-denial of the right to a hearing on
a finding that the process involved was of a rate-making nature. 430 F.2d at 1248.
See cases cited in Judge Oakes' dissenting opinion, 447 F.2d at 304.
56. See supra note 1.
57. 447 F.2d at 301.
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In light of the emphasis in both Hahn and Langevin on the possible ef-
fects of a mandatory trial type hearing upon prospective landlords, it is
apparent that at least two courts have answered the question proposed
above in terms of the section 221(d)(3) program's attractiveness to
private investors.
CIVIL PROCEDURE-Parties-Class Actions For Fraud May Be
Maintained By Consumers-Vasquez v. Superior Court of San Joaquin
County. 4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1971).
Thirty-seven named plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and others
similarly situated, sought recision of installment sales contracts for fraud-
ulent misrepresentation, both against the seller of freezers and frozen
food products and against the finance companies to which the contracts
had been subsequently assigned. Plaintiffs alleged that the defendant
seller had falsely represented to each class member that the freezers were
of high quality and were sold at a reasonable price, that the food orders
were sold at a wholesale rate, that each order would last a minimum of
seven months, and would cost less than what the plaintiffs would spend
at a retail store during a comparable period. The defendants demurred
to the complaint on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action.
The Supreme Court of California concluded that a class action could lie
against a seller where plaintiffs are able to establish the requisite com-
munity of interest with respect to the alleged representations, and against
assignees of the contracts, where they have taken with notice of a buyer's
defenses or have participated in the transactions from their inception.'
In most jurisdictions,2 including California,3 one or more members
1. Vasquez v. Superior Ct. of San Joaquin County, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d
964, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1971).
2. Most jurisdictions expressly authorize class actions by statute. Among these,
some have modeled their statutes after the original Federal Rule 23. See, e.g.,
Mo. Ann. Stat. § 507.070 (1952). A growing number, however, have adopted
the 1966 version of Federal Rule 23. See, e.g., Ohio R. Civ. P. 23 (Anderson
1971); Vt. R. Civ. P. 23 (1971). Some jurisdictions have Field Code Provisions
which codify common law principles relating to the class suit. See, e.g., Cal. Civ.
Proc. § 382 (West 1954); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1005 (McKinney 1963); Ore. Rev.
Stat. § 13-170 (1969). In those states having no class action statute, class suits are
permitted only in equity actions. See, e.g., Floreen v. Saucier, 200 Miss. 428, 27
So. 2d 557 (1946).
3. Cal. Civ. Proc. § 382 (West 1954) provides: "[W]hen the question is one
of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are nu-
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of an ascertainable class may sue for the benefit of all where there exists
a question of common or general interest to many, or where the persons
who might be made parties are so numerous that it may be impractical
to bring them all before the court.4 Actions so prosecuted are termed
"representative" or "class" actions. Courts have stated that there are four
pre-requisites to the maintenance of a class action:
1. parties too numerous to bring before the court by use of joinder;5
2. a definable class;6
3. plaintiffs who adequately represent the class ;7
4. a question of common interest sufficiently pervasive to permit
adjudication in a class action rather than in a multiplicity of suits.s
Class actions have become a favored mode of obtaining legal redress
in an age when men are increasingly exposed to group injuries. 9 Nowhere
is this more apparent than in the case of the consumer. State law govern-
ing the relations between consumers and merchants is generally utilized
by the well informed and the highly sophisticated and thus affords little
protection to those most susceptible to grievous exploitation.10 Because
merous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court, one or more
may sue or defend for the benefit of all."
4. Although § 382 of the California Civil Procedure Code would appear to
suggest an alternative basis for the class suit, "[lit uniformly has been held that
two requirements must be met in order to sustain any class action: (1) there
must be an ascertainable class ...and (2) there must be a well defined com-
munity of interest in the questions of law and fact involved affecting the parties
to be represented." Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 704, 433 P.2d 732,
739, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724, 731 (1967).
5. See, e.g., Peterson v. Donelly, 33 Cal. App. 2d 133, 91 P.2d 123 (1939).
6. See, e.g., Weaver v. Pasadena Tournament of Roses Ass'n, 32 Cal. 2d 833,
198 P.2d 514 (1948). The requirement of a definable class does not mean that
the identity of class members be known to the parties or be reasonably discover-
able by them. See Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63
Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967). Class membership must be sufficiently defined to enable
the court or some other body in a subsequent proceeding to determine who is
bound by the decision. See Note, Binding Effect of Class Actions, 67 Harv. L.
Rev. 1059 (1954).
7. See, e.g.,.Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
8. See, e.g., First Congregational Church & Soc'y of Burlington v. Evangelical
& Reformed Church, 305 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 918
(1963).
9. Kalven and Rosenfield, Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 684 (1941); Note, The Cost-Internalization Case for Class Actions,
21 Stan. L. Rev. 383 (1969).
10. Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, 275-76
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the alternative, multiple litigation, may not adequately protect the con-
sumer's rights,1' it has been argued that class proceedings are ideally
suited to the special needs of the consumer. 12 However, fraudulent mis-
representation is one cause of action in which consumers have had dif-
ficulty in establishing the requisite community of interest.' 3
Community of interest has been interpreted to mean a common in-
terest not only in the questions involved, but also in the remedy and sub-
ject matter of the suit itself.' 4 Thus, in Gaynor v. Rockefeller, 5 the New
York Court of Appeals held that a class suit could not be properly
maintained by blacks who, on behalf of an indeterminate class of like
persons, alleged discriminatory hiring practices by certain unions. The
court reasoned that the wrongs asserted were individual to the different
persons involved. Each aggrieved party could determine for himself the
appropriate remedy, and in turn, could be subject to a defense not as-
sertable against others. 16
While a class action is clearly improper where the rights and interests
of each member of the alleged class are separate and distinct from those
of every other member, a class suit may yet lie although the claims of
the parties are legally distinct and arise from separate transactions. 7
In such a case, the existence of common legal questions, a similarity in
(Bantam ed. 1968); Hester, Deceptive Sales Practices and Form Contracts-Does
the Consumer Have a Private Remedy?, 1968 Duke L.J. 831.
11. The devices of joinder, intervention, consolidation and the test case al-
most always "presuppose 'a group of economically powerful parties who are
obviously able and willing to take care of their own interests individually through
individual suits or individual decisions about joinder or intervention.'" Dolgow
v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 484 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd on other grounds,
438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1971).
12. Dole, Consumer Actions Under the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices
Act, 1968 Duke L.J. 1101; Eckhardt, Consumer Class Actions, 45 Notre Dame
Law. 663 (1970); Goldhammer, The Consumer Class Action in California, 45
L.A. B. Bull. 235 (1970); Kirkpatrick, Consumer Class Litigation, 50 Ore. L. Rev.
21 (1970); Starrs, The Consumer Class Action (pts. 1-2), 49 Boston U.L. Rev.
211, 407 (1969); Contra, Smit, Are Class Actions For Consumer Fraud a Fraud
on the Consumer?, 26 Bus. Law 1053 (1971).
13. See, e.g., Onofrio v. Playboy Club, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 740, 205 N.E.2d
308, 257 N.Y.S.2d 171 (1965).
14. Newberry Library v. Bd. of Educ., 387 Ill. 85, 95, 55 N.E.2d 147, 153
(1944). (The terms "common interest" and "community of interest" are used
interchangeably herein).
15. 15 N.Y.2d 120, 204 N.E.2d 627, 256 N.Y.S.2d 584 (1965).
16. Id. at 129, 204 N.E.2d at 631, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 590.
17. Skinner v. Mitchell, 108 Kan. 861, 197 P. 569 (1921).
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the situation of the plaintiff and those for whom he sues, and a remedy
applicable to all, may be a sufficient basis for a finding of common in-
terest.'" Such was the case in Fiorito v. Jones.'9 There, the Supreme
Court of Illinois held that where all of the plaintiffs attacking the validity
of amendments to a revenue statute were either persons dealing in the
sale of services within the categories deemed taxable under the amend-
ments or were purchasers of such services, and thus directly affected by
the statutory classification, a strong common interest in the questions
involved justified the maintenance of a representative action. The com-
mon legal question was the validity of the amendments, while the refund
to be recovered under the decree of the trial court and the declaration of
a constructive trust respectively constituted the subject matter of the suit
and the remedy.
Nevertheless, the courts have generally adhered to the principle that
separate frauds practiced on various persons, though committed through
similar means and pursuant to a common plan, cannot constitute the
basis for a representative suit. .0 Not only are such transactions legally
distinct, but each is to some extent factually different. Even where false
representations are exactly the same, the parties victimized may have
relied upon different opinions and beliefs as to those facts. Since all may
not desire the same relief, each party should be free to elect his own rem-
edy and be subject to whatever defense may be raised against him.
Furthermore, the interests of the parties may be in conflict.
This principle was recently reaffirmed by the New York Court of Ap-
peals. In Hall v. Coburn Corporation of America,21 plaintiffs signed retail
installment sales contracts which defendant, a sales finance company, had
supplied to the various merchants. Immediately upon consummation of
the agreements, the contracts were assigned to the finance company. Be-
cause the formalities of the contract relating to the size of the printed
type were in violation of a statute governing retail installment sales con-
tracts, plaintiffs sought to bring a class suit to recover the statutory pen-
alty on behalf of themselves and all others who had signed the form
contracts. The court, denying a class action, stated that where a number
of different and unrelated contracts are made between different and un-
18. See Offen v. City of Topeka, 186 Kan. 389, 350 P.2d 33 (1960).
19. 39 Ill. 2d 531, 236 N.E.2d 698 (1968), aff'd after remand, 45 Ii. 2d
15, 256 N.E.2d 833 (1968).
20. See, e.g., Garfein v. Stiglitz, 260 Ky. 430, 86 S.W.2d 155 (1935); Spear v.
H.V. Greene Co., 246 Mass. 259, 140 N.E. 795 (1923); Society Milion Athena,
Inc., v. National Bank of Greece, 281 N.Y. 282, 22 N.E.2d 374 (1939).
21. 26 N.Y.2d 396, 259 N.E.2d 720, 311 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1970).
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related sellers, no common questions arise out of the similarity in the
allegedly illegal instruments, nor will a common question arise because
the same finance company that was the assignee of the contracts had
prepared them for use.22
In refusing to enlarge the scope of the class action permitted under
New York law,2 3 the court, although not unsympathetic to the plight of
the consumer, was strongly influenced by policy considerations. The
court noted that it is the function of the legislature, and not the duty of
the courts, to effect reform of consumer credit practices and stated:
The public value of judicial sanction to this kind of class action which would
harass a finance company ... without addressing itself to the real evil of retail
credit buying is open to substantial doubt.
[W]ithout adequate public control they may become instruments of harass-
ment benefiting largely persons who activate the litigation. No significant
public benefit is discernible from the acceptance of these present class actions
which do not, on the merits asserted, justify present departure from the
existing New York rule.24
The thrust of Hall appears to be that the occurrence of a common
wrong is insufficient to create a question of common interest unless, per-
haps, plaintiffs are already united in interest.2 5 There have been excep-
tions to this rule. Kruse v. Streamwood Utilities Corp.26 and Kimbrough
v. Parker,27 though not true consumer suits, represent a modest erosion
of the prohibition of class suits based on fraud. In Kruse, a representa-
tive suit brought on behalf of all the homeowners in a village to have the
franchise of a sewer and water company declared void because of the
interest of the village board of trustees in the franchise was deemed main-
tainable. Plaintiffs sought damages representing the payments made by
them under an allegedly fraudulent scheme. Each of the plaintiffs was
both a homeowner and a subscriber to the sewer and water service and
all were united in interest. While not precluding the possibility of a class
22. Id. at 400, 259 N.E.2d at 721, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 282-83. For a discussion
and criticism of the Hall decision, see 39 Fordham L. Rev. 765 (1971).
23. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1005 (McKinney 1963).
24. 26 N.Y.2d at 403-04, 259 N.E.2d at 723, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 285-86.
25. See, e.g., Lichtyger v. Franchard Corp., 18 N.Y.2d 528, 223 N.E.2d
869, 277 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1966).
26. 34 I11. App. 2d 100, 180 N.E.2d 731 (1962).
27. 344 I1. App. 483, 101 N.E.2d 617 (1951).
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suit based on fraud, the Illinois appellate court chose to avoid the issue
of fraud, insisting that every class suit ought to be decided on its own
merits, and further noted that the alleged misrepresentations ". . . could
be considered as an essential part of the contract, and consequently the
cause of action could be considered as one lying in contract rather than
as one based upon fraudulent misrepresentations.
'2 8
The same court in its earlier Kimbrough v. Parker decision considered
an attempt by participants in an allegedly fraudulent puzzle contest to
restrain a religious corporation from further proceeding with the contest
which had been publicized in a newspaper and was ostensibly conducted
for the purpose of raising funds for a meeting house. Plaintiffs addition-
ally requested the imposition of a constructive trust on the proceeds. A
master's report supported plaintiffs' allegations that the contest was in-
herently fraudulent and the court upheld the maintenance of the action
as a class suit. 9 The facts in Kimbrough reveal that the inducements
were substantially the same for all the contestants as there were no per-
sonal solicitations and that a common fund existed out of which contri-
butions could be returned. Thus, a complete determination of all issues
bearing on the fraud could have been accomplished without a thorough
investigation into the relations of the parties.
Neither Kruse nor Kimbrough represent compelling precedents in sup-
port of the consumer class suit, but Robnet v. Miller" is more directly
related. An action was brought by buyers of freezers and food plans
against the sellers and the assignee of buyers' notes to rescind the al-
legedly fraudulent contracts and to compel return of the notes and money
paid. The court below issued an order restraining defendants from further
impairing plaintiffs' rights while litigation was pending. The plaintiffs
appealed when the order was dissolved. The Ohio Court of Appeals re-
versed the dissolution of the order. While the court failed to define the
manner in which a common fraud could be the basis of a class suit, it did
indicate that at least one of the objections to such a suit, alleged conflict
of interests among class members, was under the circumstances unrealis-
tic.31
28. 34 Ill. App. 2d at 108, 180 N.E.2d at 735.
29. 344 Ill. App. at 485-88, 101 N.E.2d at 618-19.
30. 105 Ohio App. 536, 152 N.E.2d 763 (1957).
31. Id. at 545, 152 N.E.2d at 766-67. "One frailty suggested namely, that
some of the members of the class may want to keep their home freezers, is
interesting. The class was described as including persons who were tricked, de-
ceived and misled into believing that they were getting a freezer without charge
if they would buy frozen food at one-half price and it is difficult to imagine one
of this class electing to pay out his contract to the last penny."
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The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are more amenable to class suits.
Rule 23(b) (3) authorizes class actions where a court finds "the ques-
tions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate
over any questions affecting only individual members, and that the class
action is superior to other available methods for a fair and efficient ad-
judication of the controversy. 3 2 Thus, Rule 23 would appear to have
made fraud the proper subject of a class action. 3 While a fraud case may
be unsuited for a class action where there is material variation in the
representations made or in the kinds or degrees of reliance by the per-
sons to whom they are addressed, a fraud perpetrated on numerous per-
sons by similar representations is nevertheless an appealing situation for
a class suit.34 In any event, some federal courts have applied the rule
liberally in situations involving considerable variation in the representa-
tions where they have been made pursuant to a common course of ac-
tion.35
Perhaps the most expansive application of Rule 23(b) (3) is to be
found in Contract Buyers League v. F & F Investment. 6 A class action
was brought by black purchasers of realty, alleging civil rights violations,
price fixing and the execution of contracts violative of Illinois common
law regarding fraud, usury and unconscionable contracts. The district
court held that since common questions of fact and law "predominated,"
a class action would be appropriate and any possible variance would not
belie the finding that the action presented the required predominance
since Rule 23 was intended to give district courts the necessary flexibility
to assure the effectiveness of the class action as a remedial device.3 7
Furthermore, the court noted that the rule made provision for a "sub-
sequent modification of the class that appears appropriate as the actual
32. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
33. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) maintains as prerequisites to all class suits that:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there
are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of
the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of
the class.
34. Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure, Advisory Committee's Note
to Rule 23, 39 F.R.D. 98, 103 (1966) [hereinafter referred to as Advisory
Committee's Note].
35. Fidelis Corp. v. Litton Indus., Inc., 293 F. Supp. 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
See Fischer v. Kletz, 41 F.R.D. 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Kronenberg v. Hotel
Governor Clinton, Inc. 41 F.R.D. 42 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); cf. Morris v. Burchard,
51 F.R.D. 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
36. 48 F.R.D. 7 (N.D. I11. 1969).
37. Id. at 14.
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contours of the litigation and problems of management are developed
before the court."38
Because of the minute nature of individual claims and the large num-
ber of class members, the utility of Rule 23 in consumer class actions
remains questionable. 9 The United States Supreme Court has interpreted
Rule 23 as prohibiting the aggregation of separate and distinct claims to
fulfill the $10,000 judisdictional requirement of district courts in di-
versity cases.4 0 Thus, where separate and distinct claims are advanced, a
class suit would be inappropriate unless one and possibly every member
of the class were to have a claim equivalent to the jurisdictional amount.4'
Additionally, Rule 23(c) (2) requires that class actions brought under
Rule 23 (b) (3) provide "the best notice practicable under the circum-
stances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified
with reasonable effort." Since notice to class members is to be accommo-
dated to the particular purpose and need not comply with the formalities
for service of process,42 the court possesses discretion in directing the
38. Id.
39. Consumer class actions are maintainable in the federal courts only when
jurisdictional requirements are satisfied. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332 (1970). Since
most actions to remedy consumer frauds are founded on state law, it is rare
that a federal question arises. Thus, representatives of a class are faced with
the often difficult task of obtaining complete diversity of citizenship between
themselves and the defendants. Whether the action is based on diversity or the
federal question provision, it is necessary that the amount in question exceed
$10,000. Travers and Landers, The Consumer Class Action, 18 Kan. L. Rev.
811, 816 (1970). See also Homburger, State Class Actions and the Federal Rule,
71 Colum. L. Rev. 609, 637-47 (1971).
40. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969); noted in 58 Ky. L.J. 403 (1969)
and 21 Syracuse L. Rev. 326 (1969). Under the original rule, class actions
were categorized as "true," "hybrid," and "spurious." The so-called "spurious"
action involved several rights affected by a common question and related to a
common relief, and judgment in such a suit extended only to parties and inter-
venors. Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 34, at 98. Since class members
did not unite to enforce a single title or right in which they had a common
and individual interest, individual claims could not be aggregated. See 3 B. J.
Moore, Federal Practice 23.13, at 23-2953 (2d ed. 1969). Although the 1966
amendments dispensed with the old categories, the Supreme Court, in Snyder v.
Harris, determined that claims could not be aggregated to make the jurisdictional
amount in class suits that would have been deemed "spurious" under the old rule.
394 U.S. at 335-36. However, virtually all consumer class actions for damages
would have been classified as spurious under the old rule. Travers and-Landers,
supra note 39, at 817. See generally Mhraist and Sharp, After Snyder v. Harris:
Wither Goes the Spurious Class Action?, 41 Miss. L.J. 379 (1970).
41. See C. Wright, Federal Courts 316 n.86 (2d ed. 1970).
42. Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 34, at 107.
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kind of notice. Thus, as to those members not readily identifiable, publi-
cation would appear sufficient.43 However, if the class members can be
identified but are extremely numerous, the financial burdens of individual
notice could very well prove unbearable and result in a dismissal.44 The
issue of adequate notice, however, is as yet unresolved.45
The Supreme Court of California began moving in the direction of the
Vasquez case in Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.40 Daar involved an action by a
taxicab customer against a taxi company on behalf of himself and others
similarly situated to recover overcharges made by the company in the use
of its cabs over the four year period prior to the commencement of the
suit. The court distinguished between the necessity of establishing the exis-
tence of an ascertainable class and the identification of individual class
members as a prerequisite to a representative action. It was held that the
mere fact that individual riders could not be identified at the time the suit
was commenced was not crucial because a complete determination of all
the issues affecting the class members could be made without their identifi-
cation or appearance. The trial court could establish the existence of the
alleged overcharge and, since all rates were uniform, an accounting
would reveal the amount thereof. Each class member could then come
forward to prove his separate damages. Since the issues common among
class members would be the principal issues in any subsequent individual
action, the substantial benefits both to the litigants and to the court were
found sufficient to justify the proceeding.47
The court in Daar distinguished its holding from its earlier decision in
Weaver v. Pasadena Tournament of Roses Association.4.8 In Weaver, plain-
tiffs, on behalf of themselves and all others who had been "wrongfully" de-
nied admission to the Rose Bowl game as a result of an allegedly fraudulent
and unauthorized disposition of admission tickets, sued to recover the
statutory penalty for the wrongful refusal. The court declared that a
representative suit was improper since the determination of whether any
one named plaintiff was wrongfully refused admission could not settle
the rights of the unnamed parties. Too many factors peculiar to each in-
dividual would need to be decided to reveal whether any single refusal
43. See, e.g., Berland v. Mack, 48 F.R.D. 121, 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
44. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 570 (2d. Cir. 1968) (dictum).
45. The federal courts are sharply divided on the question of notice. See, e.g.,
Clark v. American Marine Corp., 297 F. Supp. 1305, 1306 (E.D. La. 1969);
Johnson v. City of Baton Rouge, 50 F.R.D. 295, 301 (E.D. La. 1970); Northern
Natural Gas Co. v. Grounds, 292 F. Supp. 619, 636 (D. Kan. 1968).
46. 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967).
47. Id. at 715-16, 433 P.2d at 747, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 739.
48. 32 Cal. 2d 833, 198 P.2d 514 (1948).
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was wrongful.49 In Weaver, no ascertainable class existed since the rights
of each party were dependent on facts peculiar to him only. While the
class in Daar was not identifiable, the rights of all hinged on identical
issues. Weaver and Daar, taken together, establish the necessary founda-
tion upon which a class action will rest: a clearly ascertainable class of
injured persons and a common question, the determination of which will
be applicable to all.
Unlike the situation in Daar, ascertainability of a class presented no
serious impediment to the adjudication of Vasquez v. Superior Court of
San Joaquin County.50 The principal issue was that of common interest.
The court made it clear from the outset that a finding of a community of
interest would be predicated upon the existence of common questions of
sufficient pervasiveness to permit their disposition in a single suit."' The
existence of separate transactions and the fact that each class member
would have to prove his separate claim to a portion of any recovery were
not strictly determinative of the propriety of a class action. So long as
each member would not be compelled to litigate numerous and sub-
stantial questions peculiar to himself to establish his individual right to
recover subsequent to a favorable determination of those questions com-
mon to the class, substantial benefits to the litigants and to the courts
would accrue, justifying the imposition of a judgment binding on the
absent parties. 52
The community of interest requirement in Vasquez could be satisfied
only upon a showing of a common fraud. In order to prevail plaintiffs
would be required to demonstrate that the seller "made false representa-
tions with knowledge of their falsity, that these representations were made
with the intent to and did induce reasonable reliance by plaintiffs, and
that plaintiffs suffered damages as a result. ' 53
The court scrutinized the allegations set forth in the complaint in light
49. The Hall and Weaver decisions are distinguishable. In Hall, only two
questions required determination: had the defendant supplied the identical con-
tracts which plaintiffs signed and, if so, were the formalities of the contracts
violative of the statute. Such a determination, had it been made, would have
applied equally to all class members.
50. 4 Cal. 3d at 810-11, 484 P.2d at 970, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 802.
51. Id. at 809-10, 484 P.2d at 969-70, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 801-02.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 811, 484 P.2d at 970, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 802. See Cal. Civ. Code
§ 1572 (West 1954); Ach v. Finkelstein, 264 Cal. App. 2d 667, 70 Cal. Rptr.
472 (1968); 12 Williston on Contracts § 1487 Fraud and Misrepresentation,
(3d ed. 1970).
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of the elements necessary to establish fraud and found that the alleged
representations fell into two categories: those relating to the contract for
the purchase of the freezer and those concerning the frozen food con-
tract." The court concluded that if the salesmen in securing the contracts
memorized certain representations from a printed narrative and sales
manual, and recited these by rote to each member of the class, then an
inference would arise that the representations were made to each class
member and thus obviate the necessity of eliciting individual testimony.?5
Furthermore, it held erroneous any assumption at the pleadings stage
of the proceedings that plaintiffs could not establish the falsity of the
representations on a common basis especially in light of the uniform
nature of defendant seller's operating practices and policies.5 6 The falsity
of the representations concerning the various freezers could be shown on
a common basis since it was likely that all brands and models were repre-
sented among the named plaintiffs, and proof of the allegations regarding
the quality and price of the freezers purchased by named plaintiffs would
provide proof for all.57
A more difficult situation existed with regard to the representations
concerning the food contracts. Defendants argued that proof of the falsity
of representations that the food orders would last a minimum of seven
months would vary in each individual case. However, the court noted
that the use of standard orders raised a rebuttable presumption that a
defined formula was utilized to determine the customers' requirements.
If a formula had been used, then the falsity of the representations could
be demonstrated by proof of such factors as the average monthly con-
sumption of food for a family of a given size.58 Similarly, the court felt
that the allegations that the food was not sold at wholesale prices and at
a considerable savings were also amenable to proof on a common basis.5 9
The court next addressed itself to the element of reliance. Whether one
"infers" reliance from the circumstances attending a transaction ° or
"presumes" that representations have been relied on when made in regard
to a material matter and action has been taken,6" reliance may be estab-
54. 4 Cal. 3d at 811, 484 P.2d at 971, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 803.
55. Id. at 811-12, 484 P.2d at 971, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 803.
56. Id. at 812-13, 484 P.2d at 971-72, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 803-04.
57. Id. at 813, 484 P.2d at 972, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 804.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Hunter v. McKenzie, 197 Cal. 176, 239 P. 1090 (1925).
61. 3 Williston on Contracts § 480 (3d ed, 1970); Restatement of Contracts
§ 479 (1932).
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lished without recourse to direct evidence.6 2 Finally, the fact that the
amount of damages may vary as to each member who will be obliged to
establish the extent of his individual injury did not preclude the mainte-
nance of a class suit. 63 Because the complaint satisfactorily alleged the
existence of an ascertainable class and plaintiffs appeared capable of
demonstrating a community of interest so that proof of most of the im-
portant issues as to the named plaintiffs would supply proof as to all, the
action was held triable as a representative suit. 4
Defendants raised several arguments based on policy considerations.
It was insisted that the intervention of a governmental body to protect
the interests of consumers would be a far more effective and efficient
remedy than the class suit.65 It was further contended that in addition to
being unsuited to situations involving parties having reciprocal rights
and obligations, class actions were invitations to vexatious and protracted
litigation and were more punitive than compensatory in nature.6 The
court pointed out that Daar clearly established the consumer class action
as an appropriate remedy. 7 Furthermore, during the pendancy of Vas-
quez, the California legislature enacted the Consumers Legal Remedies
62. The court followed the lead of several federal class action cases which
held that individual proof may not be required to establish reliance by stock-
holders alleging fraud based on printed misrepresentations in a corporation pros-
pectus. See, e.g., Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 301 (2d Cir. 1968).
63. 4 Cal. 3d at 815, 484 P.2d at 973, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 805. Federal Rule
23 likewise holds class actions maintainable "despite the need, if liability is found,
for separate determination of the damages suffered by individuals within the
class." Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 34 at 103.
64. In determining the question of liability of the finance company defen-
dants, the court declined to accept the view that consumer installment contracts
should not, as a matter of public policy, be viewed as negotiable instruments.
See, e.g., Jordan and Warren, Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 68 Colum. L.
Rev. 387 (1968); Murphy, Another "Assault Upon the Citadel": Limiting the
Use of Negotiable Notes and Waiver-of-Defense Clauses in Consumer Sales,
29 Ohio St. L.J. 667 (1968); Note, Consumer Financing, Negotiable Instruments,
and the Uniform Commercial Code: A Solution to the Judicial Dilemma, 55
Cornell L.Q. 611 (1970). Rather it was felt that current statutory provisions and
existing case law were sufficient to resolve the issue of liability and the court
concluded that the assignee finance companies were by virtue of the allegations
proper parties to an affirmative action for recision of the contracts. 4 Cal. 3d
at 821-25, 484 P.2d at 978-80, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 810-12.
65. 4 Cal. 3d at 816-17, 484 P.2d at 974-75, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 806-07.
66. Id.
67. Id at 817, 484 P.2d at 975, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 807.
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Act"8 which specifically authorizes class actions by consumers damaged
by a seller's unfair or deceptive practices. Because it was the clear inten-
tion of the legislature not to affect class actions maintainable under other
provisions of the law, 6a the court felt justified in allowing a class action
based on fraudulent misrepresentation that not only would facilitate the
adjudication of cases brought prior to the enactment but would cover
those situations not specifically provided for by statute."0
In sweeping aside the traditional view that similar frauds practiced on
various persons cannot constitute the basis of a representative suit, the
court did not suggest that a class action will always be the most appropri-
ate method of handling the problems of consumer fraud, or even that such
a proceeding will be maintainable in every situation.71 Rather, it con-
cluded that the maintenance of a class action is not necessarily precluded,
provided that the issues which may be jointly tried, when compared to
those demanding separate adjudication, justify its maintenance.72 The
questions which must be litigated separately may not be so numerous as
to make a class action disadvantageous to the parties and the judicial
system. In this respect, Vasquesz differs from Hall, which had stressed
the differences separating the parties and viewed them as being insur-
mountable.
Overcoming the potential complexities of consumer class litigation re-
quires the fashioning of new procedural devices that will permit a court
to cope with the numerous parties, conflicting claims and seemingly my-
riad interests that appear to be so much a part of the typical class suit. To
this end, the court commended to the lower courts of the jurisdiction the
procedures of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act and Federal Rule 23
as being particularly instructive.7"
68. Cal. Civ. Code § 1750-1757 (West Supp. 1972).
69. Cal. Civ. Code § 1752 (West Supp. 1972). See Reed, Legislating for the
Consumer: An Insider's Analysis of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act, 2 Pacific
L.J. 1, 9 (1971).
70. 4 Cal. 3d at 818-19, 484 P.2d at 976, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 808.
71. Id. at 821, 484 P.2d at 977, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 809.
72. Id. at 815-16, 484 P.2d at 973-74, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 805-06.
73. Id. at 820-21, 484 P.2d at 977-78, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 809-10. Cal. Civ.
Code § 1781 provides in subdivision (c) for a hearing to determine such issues
as the propriety of a class action, the necessity for published notice, the merit
of the action, and the existence of a defense. Subdivisions (d) and (e) specify
rather liberal notice procedures while subdivision (f) forbids settlement of the
suit without notice to class members and prior court approval. Subdivision (g)
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By an imaginative interpretation of existing procedural law and in the
absence of a specific statutory authorization, the Supreme Court of
California has expanded significantly the basis of the class suit. In so
doing, it has adopted a less mechanistic, more functional approach, not
unlike that of the Federal Rule 23. Where issues are susceptible to proof
on a common basis and the interests of fairness and economy are served,
a class action may lie.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Adoption-Religious Matching of Child
and Adoptive Parents as Required by New York Statutes Held Constitu-
tional. Dickens v. Ernesto, 30 N.Y.2d 61, 281 N.E.2d 153, 330 N.Y.S.2d
346, appeal dismissed, 40 U.S.L.W. 3596 (1972).
On December 22, 1969, petitioners sought to file an application as
adoptive parents with the Erie County Department of Social Services
(respondent). In response to the caseworker's question concerning their
religious affiliation, petitioners stated that they professed no religion.
After petitioners' application was denied solely on this basis, they insti-
tuted an article 781 proceeding for a judgment (1) declaring that the
challenged constitutional and statutory provisions2 violate the federal
sets forth the manner in which notice of the judgment is to be given and pro-
vides that the judgment state the name of class members.
The court in Vasquez felt that a hearing procedure would be appropriate for
ascertaining the existence of a common interest and determining whether or not
those questions requiring separate litigation are numerous and substantial. Fur-
thermore, in the event of a "hiatus," Federal Rule 23 might prove useful. For
example, Subdivision (c) (1) of Rule 23 provides that the trial court's initial
determination may be conditional and thus subject to alteration or amendment
prior to a decision on the merits. Additionally, subdivision (4) (B) would appear
to contemplate division of class members into subclasses when such would pro-
mote efficiency.
1. Dickens v. Ernesto, 30 N.Y.2d 61, 281 N.E.2d 153, 330 N.Y.S.2d 346
(1972). Petitioners first brought an article 78 proceeding (N.Y. C.P.L.R. Art. 78
(McKinney 1963)) for a judgment declaring certain statutory provisions uncon-
stitutional in 1970.
2. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 116 (McKinney 1963), as amended (McKinney
Supp. 1971), places religious restrictions on judicial commitment of children to
private institutions, placements made by such institutions with persons other than
natural parents, judicial appointments of guardians, except guardians ad litem, and
the granting of petitions of adoption. N.Y. Soc. Services Law § 373 (McKinney
1966), as amended (McKinney Supp. 1971), places religious restrictions on place-
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constitution,3 and (2) directing the respondent to immediately process
their application for adoptive parenthood. Special term and the appellate
division found no violation of petitioners' constitutional rights,4 but
directed the respondent to accept their application.' The New York
Court of Appeals, in affirming this decision, held that statutory religious
matching provisions which require the placement of a child with persons
of the same religion "so far as consistent with the best interests of the
child" and "where practicable" do not violate the constitutional rights of
either the child or the adoptive parents.
The court in Dickens was faced with the issue of whether the religious
matching provisions of three New York statutes6 dealing with custodial
placement of children and enacted in conformity with the state constitu-
tion,7 were valid under the first and fourteenth amendments of the United
States Constitution. The court construed the legislative enactments in
ments of children with private institutions, placements of children by private in-
stitutions, appointment of guardians and granting orders of adoption. N.Y. Dom.
Rel. Law § 113 (McKinney 1964), as amended (McKinney Supp. 1971), provides
for special provisions relating to adoption from authorized agencies, to be carried
out in accordance with article VI of the Social Services Law.
N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 32 states, "When any court having jurisdiction over a
child shall commit it or remand it to an institution or agency or place it in the
custody of any person by parole, placing out, adoption or guardianship, the child
shall be committed or rermanded or placed, when practicable, in an institution or
agency governed by persons, or in the custody of a person, of the same religious
persuasion as the child."
3. U.S. Const. amend. I; U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Petitioners contend
that New York statutes, supra, create an establishment of religion, deny them free-
dom of religion under the first amendment and deny them equal protection of the
laws under the fourteenth amendment.
4. A 1971 study by the Cornell Law Review of the religious matching statutes
and judicial interpretation thereof indicates that although the United States Supreme
Court has yet to confront the issues presented by the statutes, there are aspects of
questionable constitutionality involving first amendment imputation of religion, all
of which might be interwoven to deny equal protection of the laws. Comment, A
Reconsideration of the Religious Element in Adoption, 56 Cornell L. Rev. 780,
809-829 (1971).
5. Dickens v. Ernesto, 37 App. Div. 2d 102, 322 N.Y.S.2d 581 (4th Dept.
1971). From this determination, petitioners appealed as a matter of right to the
New York Court of Appeals.
6. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 116 (McKinney Supp. 1971); N.Y. Soc. Services
§ 373 (McKinney Supp. 1971); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 113 (McKinney Supp.
1971).
7. N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 32.
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light of prior judicial application and the recent amendments to the
statutes.8 Determining the statutes to be discretionary in their applica-
tion, the court addressed itself to the constitutional challenge of the
petitioners under the first and fourteenth amendments. In applying tests
derived from recent Supreme Court decisions,' the court ultimately de-
termined the statutory provisions to be constitutional.
Adoption in New York is a judicial proceeding, with original jurisdic-
tion vested in the Family Court. 10 Basically there are two types of adop-
tion. "Public" adoption involves placement through an authorized agency
of the state," whereas "private" placement incorporates all agencies other
than those specifically designated as state agencies. 12 Both types are gov-
erned by statutory provisions which specify who may adopt, who must
8. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 116(g) (McKinney Supp. 1971); N.Y. Soc. Services
Law § 373(7) (McKinney Supp. 1971). These sections add identical parental
preference provisions to be complied with by a judge in making orders of adoption
under N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 113 (McKinney Supp. 1971). The New York Court
of Appeals quoted § 116(g) of the Family Court Act in full. It provides: "(g) The
provisions of subdivisions (a), (b), (c), (d), (e) and (f) of this section shall,
so far as consistent with the best interests of the child, and where practicable, be
applied so as to give effect to the religious wishes of the natural mother, if the child
is born out-of-wedlock, or if born in-wedlock, the religious wishes of the parents
of the child, or if only one of the parents of an in-wedlock child is then living, the
religious wishes of the parent then living. Religious wishes of a parent shall include
wishes that the child be placed in the same religion as the parent or in a different
religion from the parent or with indifference to religion or with religion a subordi-
nate consideration. Expressed religious wishes of a parent shall mean those which
have been set forth in a writing signed by the parent, except that, in a non-agency
adoption, such writing shall be an affidavit of the parent. In the absence of ex-
pressed religious wishes, as defined in this subdivision, determination of the reli-
gious wishes, if any, of the parent, shall be made upon the other facts of the
particular case, and, if there is no evidence to the contrary, it shall be presumed
that the parent wishes the child to be reared in the religion of the parent." (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1971).
9. See text accompanying notes 60-85 infra.
10. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 641 (McKinney Supp. 1971). Effective September
1, 1972, the Family Court will have exclusive original jurisdiction over adoption
proceedings. Until that time, the Surrogate's Court shall have and exercise con-
current jurisdiction.
11. N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 109 (McKinney 1964). "'Authorized agency' shall
mean an authorized agency as defined in the social welfare law and, for the pur-
poses of this article, shall include such corporations incorporated or organized
under the laws of this state as may be specifically authorized by their certificates of
incorporation to receive children for purposes of adoption." Id.
12. Id. § 109(5). "'Private-placement adoption' shall mean any adoption
other than that of a minor who has been placed for adoption by an authorized
agency."
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consent and the procedures involved in applications for the court order
of adoption. 3 Specific provisions, discussed infra, provide for the con-
sideration of the child's religion in placement proceedings.' 4
Much attention is given in New York to the issue of religion as a factor
in adoption proceedings. Religious matching requirements appear in the
state constitution,' 5 the Family Court Act,' 6 the Social Services Law,',
and the Domestic Relations Lawl 8-all of which govern state and agency
placements, and ultimately, the court order of adoption. 9 Most other
jurisdictions presently adhere to religious matching requirements in cus-
tody and adoption proceedings,20 although a recent study indicates that a
number of jurisdictions are currently attempting to harmonize the reli-
gious considerations with public temporal concerns. 21 The statistics indi-
cate, however, that in both the public and private forum, there continues
a strong sentiment for the recognition of the relationship between religion
and society.22
No entirely consistent approach to the problem of reconciling the statu-
tory requirements with constitutional guarantees of freedom of religion 2
13. N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law §§ 109-16 (McKinney 1964), as amended (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1971).
14. N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 32; N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 116 (McKinney Supp.
1971); N.Y. Soc. Services Law § 373 (McKinney Supp. 1971); N.Y. Dom Rel.
Law § 113 (McKinney Supp. 1971).
15. N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 32.
16. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 116 (McKinney 1963), as amended (McKinney
Supp. 1971).
17. N.Y. Soc. Services Law § 373 (McKinney 1966), as amended (McKinney
Supp. 1971).
18. N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 113 (McKinney 1964), as amended (McKinney
Supp. 1971).
19. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 116(a)-(d) (McKinney 1963).
20. Note, Religion as a Factor in Adoption, Guardianship and Custody, 54
Colum. L. Rev. 376 (1954) indicated that in 1954 forty-three jurisdictions had
religious matching statutory provisions, although there existed some difference in
application and discretion from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
21. Comment, A Reconsideration of the Religious Element in Adoption, 56
Cornell L. Rev. 780 (1971).
22. Id. at 783-92. The study updates the statutory policy with regard to reli-
gious considerations. It is interesting to note that of the original forty-three juris-
dictions having religious preference statutes in 1954, only thirty-six presently have
statutes in force. The trend indicated by the study is toward statutory reform and
agency responses to "evolving standards of child care," although differences con-
tinue to be present.
23. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . ." U.S. Const. amend. I.
19721
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
and equal protection of the laws 24 has permeated the decisions of the New
York courts. Initially, the courts were strict in interpreting and applying
the statutory religious matching requirements. 25 A number of early cases
expressly denied the placement of a child with a person of a religious
persuasion other than that of the natural parent. 26 Even where permission
to adopt was denied on other grounds, the court has taken judicial notice
of the fact that the petitioners and the natural parent espoused different
religions.27 In 1951, one of the more significant cases in the development
of the New York position arose in connection with what is now the "when
practicable" provision of the Family Court Act.2s It provides:
In appointing guardians of children, except guardians ad litem, and in grant-
ing orders of adoption, the court must, when practicable, appoint only as such
guardians, and only give custody through adoption to, persons of the same
religious faith or persuasion as that of the child. 29
In In re Santos,30 two children had been committed to a Jewish social
agency, as a result of misrepresentations of the proprietor's religion. When
this misrepresentation was subsequently discovered, the children's mother
brought suit, claiming that the agency was an improper guardian. The
court agreed and adopted a mandatory interpretation of the statute, stat-
ing, "the legislative mandate leaves no area for judicial discretion."'"
24. "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States, and of the State wherein they
reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV,
section 1.
. 25. See Comment, The Religious Factor in New York Adoption Proceedings,
18 Syracuse L. Rev. 825 (1967).
26. In re Guardianship of Newman, 142 Misc. 617, 255 N.Y.S. 777 (Sur. Ct.
1932); In re Hauser, 189 N.Y.S. 51 (Sur. Ct. 1921); In re McConnon, 60 Misc.
22, 112 N.Y.S. 590 (Sur. Ct. 1908); In re Guardianship of Jaquet, 40 Misc. 575,
82 N.Y.S. 986 (Sur. Ct. 1903).
27. In re Anonymous, 195 Misc. 6, 11, 88 N.Y.S.2d 829, 834 (Sur. Ct. 1949).
28. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 116 (McKinney 1963), formerly N.Y.C. Dom.
Rel. Ct. Act § 88 (McKinney 1933).
29. Id. § 116(c). Similar provisions are found in N.Y. Soc. Services Law
§ 373(c) (McKinney 1966) and N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 113 (McKinney 1964).
30. In re Santos, 278 App. Div. 373, 105 N.Y.S.2d 716 (1st. Dept. 1951),
appeal dismissed, 304 N.Y. 483, 109 N.E.2d 71 (1952).
31. "On the facts presented herein, the legislative mandate leaves no area for
judicial discretion. It was and still is practicable to give these infants to an institu-
tion under the control of persons of their religious faith in fulfillment of the statute
110 [Vol. I
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The mandatory approach expressed in Santos was reflected clearly in
subsequent decisions of the New York courts in denying petitions for
cross-religious adoptions. 2 In spite of the statutory language, "when prac-
ticable," the courts refused to consider the express limitation of the statu-
tory language outside the realm of religious consideration. Material
factors, such as the motives of the adoptive parents, their emotional, fi-
nancial and marital stability, were not given comparable weight in the
final determination of the "best interests"8 3 of the child; a religious vari-
ance was an insurmountable obstacle.
Some erosion of this position occurred in 1958 when the New York
Court of Appeals for the first time considered the religious matching re-
quirement in adoption proceedings,. 4 and in so doing, extended in a
limited manner the application of the statute. In In re Maxwell,3 the
court affirmed the grant of a petition for the adoption of a presumably
Roman Catholic child by Presbyterians, who agreed to raise the child as
a Roman Catholic. Petitioners had instituted adoption proceedings based
on the consent of the mother who had abandoned the child. But the
mother reappeared and introduced evidence of her Catholicism. The
court, however, accepted the natural mother's original affidavit, stating
that she had no religion, at face value, and granted adoption to the peti-
tioners, relying on the "when practicable" clause. The court stated that
the established policy of the state had not changed, but that under the
facts of the case,86 where no faith existed, the clause "when practicable"
was given broader interpretation since the statute was:
[N]ecessarily designed to accord the trial judge a discretion to approve as
that their 'religious faith be preserved and protected by the Court' ..... " Id. at 375,
105 N.Y.S.2d at 718.
32. In re Anonymous, 207 Misc. 240, 137 N.Y.S.2d 720 (Saratoga County Ct.
1955) ;The petition was denied even though the petitioners agreed to raise the child
as a Roman Catholic, the religion of the natural parents.
33. There are a number of material factors which adoption agencies consider
as criteria in the selection of able and fit parents for adoption. While the criteria
vary slightly from agency to agency, the cited factors are general in nature and
application, and are presented to the court for consideration in making the final
court order of adoption.
34. In re Maxwell, 4 N.Y.2d 429, 151 N.E.2d 848, 176 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1958).
35. "It is, of course, the settled policy of this state to insist upon adoption by
persons of the same religious faith as that of the child. But this policy does not re-
quire a court to deny custody to adoptive parents where a child has been accepted
by them following a declaration or representation by the mother ... that she does
not embrace any religious faith." Id. at 434, 151 N.E.2d at 850, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 284.
36. Id.
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adoptive parents persons of a faith different from the child's in exceptional
situations.37
The court restricted its holding, however, stating that the presence of the
phrase "when practicable" was intended by the legislature to enable the
court to "relax the requirement in the unusual case such as the one before
US." 38
While this rationale suggests a departure from the previously strict
mandatory approach, the court avoided a direct consideration of the
religious protection question by accepting the affidavit of the natural
mother that she embraced no specific religion over her later statement of
professing Catholicism. Moreover, the significance of the decision is fur-
ther diluted by the weight the court gave, in reaching its decision, to the
promise of the adoptive parents to raise the child in the Catholic religion
in accordance with the wishes of the natural mother.40
The Maxwell holding did not adequately define the limits of judicial
discretion to be exercised under the religious matching statutes; hence
clarification was necessary. Rather than clarify the "discretion"'" of
the holding in Maxwell, the New York Court of Appeals in Starr v.
De Rocco 42 directly confronted the requirement in the state constitu-
tion,43 which also provides that in custody and adoption proceedings, the
court shall, when practicable, place the child in the custody of a person
of the same religious persuasion.44 In this case the New York Supreme
Court, Special Term, had awarded custody of two infant orphans to the
petitioners, who were of a different religious persuasion than that of the
children. The Appellate Division reversed, stating that:
37. Id.
38. Id. at 434, 151 N.E.2d at 851, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 284.
39. "New York [with the decision in the Maxwell case] has taken its place
with the majority of jurisdictions in interpreting the religious requirements of the
adoption statutes liberally ...." Note, 10 Syracuse L. Rev. 124, 126 (1958); But
see Comment, The Religious Factor in New York Adoption Proceedings, 18 Syra-
cuse L. Rev. 825, 829 (1967).
40. 4 N.Y.2d at 433, 151 N.E.2d at 850, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 283. The 4-3 decision
had no majority opinion due to fact that Judge Froessel concurred in the affirmance
solely on the ground that petitioners agreed to have the child baptized and raised
as a Catholic.
41. See supra note 35.
42. 24 N.Y.2d 1011, 250 N.E.2d 240, 302 N.Y.S.2d 835 (1969).
43. N.Y. Const. art. VI, 32.
44. Id.
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this constitutional provision means more than a mere extension of authority to
exercise discretion as to the religious aspect in custody matters.45
In a per curiam decision affirming the order of the Appellate Division
which had granted custody to parents of the same religious faith, the
Court of Appeals disregarded the discretionary language of Maxwell,
stating that judicial discretion short of compelling reason was contrary
to the intent of the state constitution, and therefore unavailable to the
courts.46
Faced with a broad challenge to the religious matching statutes 7 in
New York, the Court of Appeals in Dickens applied the criteria of the
1970 amendments to these statutes.48 In reviewing the earlier decisions
of the court dealing with religious protection statutes, the Dickens court
apparently recognized the continuing mutual respect between government
and society49 in considering religion as relevant in the placement of chil-
dren for adoption, a respect mandated by the New York State Constitu-
tion. 50 The extent to which religious matching governs in the challenged
legislation was, in the opinion of the court, modified by the 1970 amend-
ments of three legislative provisions5' which:
45. 29 App. Div. 2d 662, 286 N.Y.S.2d 313 (2d Dept. 1968), aff'd mem., 24
N.Y.2d 1011, 250 N.E.2d 240, 302 N.Y.S.2d 835 (1969).
46. "The Appellate Division found that this provision was intended to prohibit
the placement of a child with a guardian of a religious persuasion other than that
of the child unless some compelling reason required otherwise; that there were
available able and willing persons, blood relatives of the children, who professed
the same religious faith as them . . . in the absence of a compelling reason to
avoid the constitutional mandate, Special Term had exercised a judicial discretion
which was not available to it." 24 N.Y.2d at 1012, 250 N.E.2d at 241, 302
N.Y.S.2d at 836.
47. In a 1955 study, Pfeffer, Religion in the Upbringing of Children, 35 B.U.L.
Rev. 333, 373 (1955), the author describes the various statutes governing religion
in custody and adoption as "religious protection" statutes.
48. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 116 (McKinney 1963), as amended (McKinney
Supp. 1971); N.Y. Soc. Services Law § 373 (McKinney 1966), as amended
(McKinney Supp. 1971); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 113 (McKinney 1964), as
amended (McKinney Supp. 1971).
49. See generally List, A Study of "Religious Protection" Laws, 13 Buffalo L.
Rev. 9 (1963). Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) characterizes the Ameri-
can people as a "religious people."
50. N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 32.
51. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 116 (McKinney Supp. 1971); N.Y. Soc. Services
Law § 373 (McKinney Supp. 1971); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 113 (McKinney Supp.
1971).
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"amended the respective statutes . . . to eliminate any requirement that the
religious matching provisions be applied mandatorily." Thus, the challenged
legislation places primary emphasis on the temporal best interests of the child,
although the religious preference of the natural parents remains a relevant
consideration. 52
The religious preference is placed in perspective as the decision in Dickens
recognizes that the flexibility of the statute grants broad discretion to the
court in deciding what is best for the child.
The court then addressed the fundamental question of the constitution-
ality of religious matching statutes. It was the contention of the petitioners,
that New York has, by statute53 created an establishment of religion and
inhibited the free exercise thereof, in violation of the first amendment;
petitioners further alleged an arbitrary classification denying them equal
protection of the laws as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. As to
the first amendment objections, U.S. Supreme Court decisions in the de-
velopment and history of the first amendment demonstrate that the es-
tablishment and free exercise clauses are prohibitions drawn in a
sweeping fashion which have been applied in a case by case approach.54
Inconsistency in these interpretations by the court is due in part to
"too sweeping utterances on aspects of these clauses that seemed clear in re-
lation to the particular cases but have limited meaning as general principles." 5
The U.S. Supreme Court has yet to directly confront the controversial
issues generated by the religious matching requirements in adoption
laws. 6 U.S. Supreme Court decisions in other church-state areas are
particularly susceptible to broad and general phrasing, like the "wall of
52. 30 N.Y.2d at 66, 281 N.E.2d at 155, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 348.
53. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 116(g) (McKinney Supp. 1971); N.Y. Soc. Ser-
vices Law § 373 (McKinney Supp. 1971); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 113 (McKinney
Supp. 1971).
54. Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 667-72 (1970). See generally,
L. Pfeffer, Church, State and Freedom (1967).
55. 397 U.S. at 668.
56. The U.S. Supreme Court has refused certiorari in one Massachusetts case,
In re Goldman, 331 Mass. 647, 121 N.E.2d 843 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
942 (1955). The Massachusetts court upheld the objections of the guardian ad
litem to the adoption of the twin infants by a Jewish couple, although the natural
mother had consented in writing to the adoption with full knowledge of the religion
of the adoptive parents. The court preserved an imputation of the mother's Catholic
religion and rejected the contention of difficulties "underlying the concept that a
child too young to understand any religion, even imperfectly, nevertheless may
have a religion." Id. at 652, 121 N.E.2d at 846.
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separation" erected in the dictum in Everson v. Board of Education.57
Notwithstanding, since the 1940 decision of the Court to apply the estab-
lishment and free exercise provisions to the states through the fourteenth
amendment, 5s decisions have attempted to define the manner in which
"there shall be no concert or union or dependency '59 between church and
state.
From recent Supreme Court decisions, there emerge a series of criteria
which can be applied as guidelines in measuring legislative enactments
against the scope of first amendment provisions. The first test, formulated
in Everson,"0 prohibits legislation enacted in terms of comparative reli-
gions:
Neither [state or federal government] can pass laws which aid one religion,
aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another ... In the words of Jeffer-
son, the clause ... was intended to erect a "wall of separation between church
and state.""'
A second test, expressed by Mr. Justice Douglas in the 1952 decision of
Zorach v. Clauson,62 while acknowledging the importance of religion,
precludes a causal relationship: ". . . [T]here shall be no concert or
union or dependency one on the other."3 More exacting in its deline-
ation of "neutrality" is the test established by Abington School District v.
Schempp,6 4 which requires that all legislation have "secular legislative
purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion."65
Another test in attempting to articulate the scope of the first amendment
establishment clause is expressed in Walz v. Tax Commission:66
57. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). The Court upheld a resolution of the board of
education authorizing the reimbursement of parents for public transport of children
to sectarian schools.
58. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). "The fundamental concept
of liberty embodied in that [Fourteenth] Amendment embraces the liberties guaran-
teed by the First Amendment." Id. at 303.
59. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952). "We are a religious people,
whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being." Id. at 313. The Court upheld a
public school release-time program, in which religion classes were held outside
the schools.
60. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
61. Id. at 15-16.
62. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
63. Id. at 312.
64. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
65. Id. at 222; see Bd. of Educ. v. Allen. 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968).
66. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
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Determining that the legislative purpose.., is not aimed at establishing, spon-
soring or supporting religion does not end the inquiry, however. We must also
be sure that the end result-the effect-is not an excessive governmental
entanglement with religion.6 7
Finally, in 1971 the Court examined the cumulative effect of prior tests
formulated in establishment clause challenges, and in so doing, developed
a three-test criteria. In Lemon v. Kurtzman,6" petitioners challenged the
constitutionality of Rhode Island and Pennsylvania statutes6 which
granted state aid to private schools. Here the Court summarized the two
tests formulated in the Schempp decision-"secular purpose" and "pri-
mary effect" and the Walz standard of "excessive entanglement" as "cu-
mulative criteria" to be applied in determining the validity of such legisla-
tion and establishment clause challenges.7
The court in Dickens chose to apply the Abington test and found the
matching provisions to be within its confines, 71 in view of the fact that
religion is not a controlling factor in placement proceedings. 72 In examin-
ing the statutory amendments,7 3 the New York court concluded that
legislation which places primary emphasis on the best interests of the
child insofar as religious matching, undoubtedly obviates government
entanglement 74 and meets the necessary constitutional prerequisites." To
67. Id. at 674.
68. 403 U.S. 602 (1971), rehearing denied, 404 U.S. 876 (1972).
69. R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. §§ 16-51-1 to -9 (Supp. 1970); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 24,
§§ 5601-09 (Supp. 1971).
70. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-16 (1971).
71. "'[T]o withstand the strictures of [that] [first amendment] Clause,' the
Supreme Court has observed, 'there must be a secular legislative purpose and a
primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.' " 30 N.Y.2d at 66, 281
N.E.2d at 156, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 349.
72. "Religion has never been an exclusive, or... a controlling, factor in adop-
tion proceedings. The standard contained in the new amendments to the religious
conformity provisions-namely, 'the best interests of the child'- is a flexible one,
affording the court a broad discretion in deciding whether a proposed adoption
would be best for the child." Id. at 66-67, 281 N.E.2d at 156, 330 N.Y.S.2d at
349.
73. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 116 (g) (McKinney Supp. 1971); N.Y. Soc. Ser-
vices Law § 373(7) (McKinney Supp. 1971).
74. 30 N.Y.2d at 66, 281 N.E.2d at 156, 336 N.Y.S. at 349. Having at once
determined the primary purpose of the legislation to be secular in nature and
discretionary in application, the court successfully applied the Abington test. Id.
75. "Legislation which provides for the placement of a child with adoptive
parents of the same religion 'so far as consistent with the best interests of the child,
and where practicable' . . . undoubtedly fulfills a 'secular legislative purpose' and
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support their claim of unconstitutionality under the establishment clause,
petitioners asserted that subdivision (e) of section 116 of the Family
Court Act,", which defined the meaning of the "when practicable" clause,
effectively precluded them from consideration for adoptive parenthood.
The court strongly emphasized that this provision is limited by the amend-
ment which effects parental wishes only "so far as consistent with the best
interests of the child. 77 In applying the amendment to the statute, the
court reasoned that both secular and religious considerations would be
taken into account in determining the child's best interests.78 As to the
contention of petitioners that "free exercise of religion" is violated by the
religious matching requirements, the court affirmed the position of the
lower court that adoptive parents without religious affiliations would be
eligible to adopt a child of unknown religious background or a child sur-
rendered without qualification by the natural parents.79 While it is to be
recognized that matching requirements present an additional difficulty80
for some people to adopt a child, the court reasoned that petitioners are
not limited in their search for an adoptive child to their respective com-
munity.8' Citing the Supreme Court decision in Sherbert v. Verner,'2
that legislation, to avoid constitutional challenge regarding free exercise
of religion, must be justified by a compelling state interest in the regula-
tion of the subject,3 the court here determined that the challenged legis-
certainly reflects and preserves a 'benevolent neutrality' toward religion. . . . And,
just as clearly, the 'matching' provisions neither have the 'primary effect' of ad-
vancing or inhibiting religion, ...nor foster an 'excessive government entangle-
ment' with church interests." Id.
76. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 116(e) (McKinney 1963) provides: "The words
'when practicable' as used in this section shall be interpreted as being without force
or effect if there is a proper or suitable person of the same religious faith or per-
suasion as that of the child available for appointment as guardian, or to be de-
signated as custodian, or to whom control may be given, or to whom orders of
adoption may be granted; or if there is a duly authorized association, agency,
society or institution under the control of persons of the same religious faith or
persuasion as that of the child, at the time available and willing to assume the
responsibility for the custody of or control over any such child.
77. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 116 (g) (McKinney Supp. 1971); N.Y. Soc. Services
Law § 373(7) (McKinney Supp. 1971).
78. 30 N.Y.2d at 67, 281 N.E.2d at 156, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 350.
79. Id. at 67-68, 281 N.E.2d at 157, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 350.
80. Comment, A Reconsideration of the Religious Element in Adoption, 56
Cornell L. Rev. 780, 821-822 (1971).
81. 30 N.Y.2d at 68, 281 N.E.2d at 157, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 350.
82. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
83. Id. at403.
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lation served a valid secular purpose, and as such, neither discriminated
against the petitioners because they had no religious persiuasion, nor
forced them to adopt a religion. s4 Moreover, the court directed the re-
spondent to accept and process the application of the petitioners for
adoptive parenthood."5
In their final contention the petitioners claimed that the legislative
provisions created an arbitrary classification, which when applied to their
application, denied to them equal protection of the laws, since the enact-
ments had no relevance to the purpose of adoption laws. 6 Noting that
the amendments to the adoption laws clearly allow the surrendering parent
the expression of a religious preference, the court dismissed this conten-
tion, reasoning that petitioners were actually decrying "the shortages of
adoptive children and surrendering parents without religious affiliation
or preference. 8 7 The court recognized the well established right of a
parent to control the religious upbringing of the child as a right guaran-
teed under the fourteenth amendment, 8 and in the absence of parents, it
becomes a valid exercise of the state's power as parens patriae in regu-
lating the order of adoption. 9 With the best interests of the child as the
source, direction and limiting consideration in determining the reason-
ableness of the state's action, the court dismissed the constitutional chal-
lenge of the petitioners.
The decision of the New York Court of Appeals in Dickens, appears
to advance a more enlightened and flexible criteria in adoption proceed-
ings.90 Although the decision does not obviate the religious matching
84. 30 N.Y.2d at 68, 281 N.E.2d at 157, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 350.
85. In affirming the decision of the Appellate Division, which directed the res-
pondent to process the application of the petitioners for adoption, the court re-
asserted this directive.
86. 30 N.Y.2d at 68, 281 N.E.2d at 157, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 350.
87. Id.
88. The opinion of the Appellate Division was quite specific in recognizing
this common law right. 37 App. Div. 2d 102, 105, 322 N.Y.S.2d 581, 583 (4th
Dept. 1971), referring to Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
89. Id. at 105, 322 N.Y.S.2d at 583; cf. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510, 512 (1925).
90. In a recent challenge to judicial discretion in granting cross religious child
placement in New Jersey, the New Jersey Supreme Court held, that absent special
circumstances, adoption cannot be denied solely on the ground that prospective
adoptive parents lack belief in a Supreme Being or lack church affiliation. In re
Adoption of E., 59 N.J. 36, 279 A.2d 785 (1971). The facts are similar to the
Dickens case, except that the New Jersey statutes do not require religious matching
in custody and adoption proceedings, nor is there legal presumption that the religion
[Vol.' I
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requirement in New York child placement proceedings, its mandatory
character is appreciably modified, and the flexibility now built in presents
a significant improvement. In a jurisdiction which has steadfastly adhered
to a strict construction of the statutory language, 91 the decision reflects a
definitive policy change, although there remain important substantive
issues which this distinguished court failed to address itself to. The
determination of what a religion signifies in terms of the rights of
the child and the ramifications of its consideration present formidable
questions for judicial analysis. With the increased significance of
adoption in our society, and the enormous growth in applications for
adoptive parenthood,9 2 the compelling importance of its prerogatives must
be affirmed in both legislative enactment and judicial wisdom. If New
York is to promote the enduring best interest of its citizen children, the
courts must be prodigious in their vigilance over the protection of indi-
vidual rights. The discretion vested in the courts to determine the impor-
tant multiple interests of family life, balancing the needs of the child with
the protection of both natural and adoptive parents, is indeed a compel-
ling task. However difficult it is to define the relationship between religion
and society, a definition must be had, for the protection of society in
general, but most especially in the hope that the adoptive familial situ-
ation might "imitate natural sonship perfectly." 93 The problem presents
no small challenge:
Pure logic and intellect may be satisfied with absolutes, but wisdom demands
something more. The problem that underlies . .. "religious protection" laws-
the relation between religion and the free society-is profoundly difficult, and
profoundly important; there can be no easy solution. But if the analysis were
of the child is that of the parent. N.J. Stat. Ann., tit. 9, ch. 3, § 23(a) (1960) is
the only indication of religious affiliation, wherein it provides due regard for the
religious background of the child in appointing an agency to initially care for the
child. The New Jersey Supreme Court, in reversing the lower court decision, held
that where the sole ground for denying the adoption was the religious belief of the
applicants, who were otherwise fit, the court would grant the adoption as an ex-
ercise of its original jurisdiction. In re Adoption of E, supra at 57, 279 A.2d at 796.
91. See text accompaning notes 25-46 supra.
92. Comment, A Reconsideration of the Religious Element in Adoption, 56
Cornell L. Rev., 780, 781-786 (1971). In the last decade, adoptions have increased
from 96,000 in 1958 to 166,000 in 1968. Id. at 781.
93. Ramsey, The Legal Imputation of Religion to an Infant in Adoption Pro-
ceedings, 34 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 649 (1969), quoting Thomas Aquinas in Summa
Theologicae, III (Sup.), Q. 57, art. 1, ad. 1.
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conceived of, not as a search for absolutes, but rather as an attempt to under-
stand all the competing interests, including the interests represented by the
concept of sovereignty and the manner of its disposition by the people, then
wisdom may be served.94
And so may justice.
94. List, A Child and a Wall: A Study of "Religious Protection" Laws, 13
Buffalo L. Rev. 9, 57-58 (1963).
